Speakers
Invited Address (Chair: José Soto)
Abstract: The assumption that emotion is the direct cause of behavior is widespread but the evidence for it is surprisingly weak and confounded. This talk reviews the evidence and proposes an alternative theory depicting emotion as a feedback system. One corollary is that people will often use their emotional reactions as cues to how much they learned.
Cognition and Emotion Sponsored Symposium: Emotion and Social Influence (Chair: Max Weisbuch)
Abstract: I will report a series of studies that examine the ways in which another person's expressive responses to an emotional event shape our own appraisals of and emotional responses to the same event. I will compare two processes that could account for this social influence on the emotion process--emotional contagion and social appraisal--and will argue that the evidence from our own research is largely consistent with the notion that others' expressive reactions to an event influence our own reactions to the same event through a process of social appraisal.
Abstract: Emotions influence not only what we think about people and events, but also how we process and evaluate new information. Rich bodies of prior work suggest that happy mood leads to somewhat careless, heuristic-based processing of persuasive messages, and creates “rose-colored glasses” through which we evaluate messages and products. Functional approaches to emotion suggest, however, that different positive emotions should activate distinct adaptive goals, and the profiles of cognitive mechanisms that support achieving those goals. If this is the case, then different positive emotions should nudge persuasive message processing and consumer product evaluation in somewhat different directions, reflecting more finely-tuned adaptive functions. Our research supports this proposal, finding that certain positive emotions (awe and nurturant love) lead to more skeptical evaluation of weak persuasive messages; that no single cognitive mechanism accounts for the range of positive emotion effects on message processing; and that different positive emotions make different kinds of consumer products especially appealing. Implications of a functional perspective for research on social cognition and influence processes are discussed.
Abstract: Emotions influence attitudes in a variety of ways that mimic the processes by which seemingly different variables (e.g., source expertise) operate. Research illustrating these multiple mechanisms is presented. For example, emotions can operate by invoking simple heuristics, biasing thinking, serving as an argument, or affecting the amount of information processing that occurs. Special attention is given to recent research specifying the conditions under which emotions can serve to validate people’s thoughts to persuasion attempts. When emotions validate positive thoughts, persuasion is enhanced but when emotions validate negative thoughts, persuasion is diminished. Emotions validate thoughts when conditions foster high thinking, the emotion follows the thoughts, and the appraisal of the emotion fosters confidence rather than doubt. Research on both positive and negative emotions is presented and differences in outcomes for different negative emotions (e.g., anger versus sadness) are described.
Emotion Review Sponsored Symposium: Neuroscience and Emotion Theory (Chair: Reg Adams)
Abstract: Culture-gene coevolutionary theory posits that cultural values have evolved, are adaptive and influence the social and physical environments under which genetic selection operates. In a series of behavioral and neuroimaging studies, we provide evidence for culture-gene coevolution of emotion in mind and brain. Specifically, our findings suggest culture-gene coevolution between allelic frequency of 5-HTTLPR and cultural values of individualism-collectivism and support the notion that cultural values buffer genetically susceptible populations from increased prevalence of affective disorders. Implications of the current findings for understanding culture-gene coevolution of human brain and behaviour as well as how this coevolutionary process may contribute to global variation in pathogen prevalence and population disparities in affective disorders, such as anxiety and depression, are discussed.
Abstract: The words we use to describe emotions can provide insight into the basic processes that contribute to emotional experience. We propose that emotions arise partly from the neural interaction of one’s current affective state, one’s previous affective state, one’s predictions for how these may change, and the outcomes that one experiences. These states can be represented and inferred from neural systems that encode shifts in outcomes and make predictions using associative information. We demonstrate that emotion labels are reliably differentiated from one another using only simple cues about these affective trajectories through time. When a worse-than-expected outcome follows the prediction that something good will happen, that situation is labeled as anger, whereas when a worse-than-expected outcome follows the prediction that something bad will happen, that situation is labeled sadness. This work indicates that information about affective movement through time and changes in affective trajectory may be a fundamental aspect of emotion categories.
Where in the brain are emotions?
Abstract: Although researchers traditionally searched for the discrete anatomical basis of emotions in the brain, growing evidence suggests that emotions emerge from a set of domain-general processes that correspond to broadly distributed brain networks. In this talk, I will begin by presenting findings from a recent meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion (summarizing studies published between 1990-2007). Contrary to the belief that specific brain regions support specific emotions, our meta-analytic results found that certain brain areas (e.g., the amygdala) had increases in activity across a number of different emotion experiences and perceptions (e.g., increased amygdala activity did not correspond consistently and specifically to fear). Furthermore, emotions were supported by brain regions involved in more basic psychological processes that are not specific to emotion such as the instantiation of affective states, categorization and language, and attention. I will next present an fMRI study showing that brain regions corresponding to these more basic processes show increased activity during emotion and body states, but also thoughts, suggesting that they comprise general psychological “ingredients” of the mind. The implications of these findings for a psychological constructionist view of emotion (and of the mind more generally) are discussed.
Invited Address (Chair: José Soto)
Abstract: Five new ideas about the nature, origin, and function of emotion have appeared in the last five years. (1) Nature of emotion: Traditional views of emotions as innate affect programs have been challenged (Barrett, 2006). A new, emergent view sees behaviors and expressions as constituents rather than indicators of emotion (Coan, 2010). (2) Origin: Although affective reactions may be unconscious, automatic, and low level, through iterative reprocessing they become conscious, cognitively-shaped emotional states (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007). (3) Behavior: Since conscious emotional experience is slow, its primary impact on behavior is often indirect (Baumeister, et al (2007). (4) Cognition: Many explanations have been proposed for affective influences on cognitive processing, but recent research suggests a simple alternative (Clore & Huntsinger, 2009). (5) Perception: Emotions serve multiple functions, but the success of a resource-based account of visual perception suggests a resource view of emotion (Zadra, Clore, & Proffitt, in preparation).